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Abstract
We consider the problem of efficient operation of a
barter exchange platform for indivisible goods. We
introduce a dynamic model of barter exchange where
in each period one agent arrives with a single item
she wants to exchange for a different item. We
study a homogeneous and stochastic environment: an
agent is interested in the item possessed by another
agent with probability p, independently for all pairs
of agents. We consider two settings with respect to
the types of allowed exchanges: a) Only two-way
cycles, in which two agents swap their items, b) Two
or three-way cycles. The goal of the platform is to
minimize the average waiting time of an agent.
Somewhat surprisingly, we find that in each of
these settings, a policy that conducts exchanges in a
greedy fashion is near optimal, among a large class
of policies that includes batching policies. Further,
we find that for small p, allowing three-cycles can
greatly improve the waiting time over the two-cycles
only setting. Specifically, we find that a greedy policy
achieves an average waiting time of Θ(1/p2) in setting
a), and Θ(1/p3/2) in setting b). Thus, a platform can
achieve the smallest waiting times by using a greedy
policy, and by facilitating three cycles, if possible.
Our findings are consistent with empirical and
computational observations which compare batch-
ing policies in the context of kidney exchange pro-
grams.
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1 Introduction
A marketplace for barter exchange provides opportu-
nities for agents to exchange items directly, without
monetary payments. There is a growing number of
such marketplaces facilitating the exchange of a va-
riety of items. We consider the problem faced by an
exchange platform for indivisible items, that seeks to
enable users to complete a desirable trade as early
as possible. A major lever a platform operator has
at her disposal is the policy employed in conducting
exchanges, for example, greedy, batching, etc. We
study which policy should be used in order to mini-
mize the waiting time of users in the face of stochas-
tic individual demands for items. We investigate this
question under different settings determined by the
feasible types of exchanges, which are often driven by
the technology adopted by the marketplace.
Background and motivation. A number of
barter exchange platforms exist for swapping a va-
riety of items. For instance, www.homeexchange.com
and www.ReadItSwapIt.com are decentralized mar-
ketplaces that enable pairwise swapping by mutual
agreement of homes for vacation and books respec-
tively. Finding a pairwise exchange is challenging be-
cause it requires two users to each possess an item
that the other desires [9]. www.Swap.com, which
allows for swapping (and selling) of preowned chil-
drens items, books and DVDs, is a centralized plat-
form Centralization allows it to execute multi-way
exchanges, where each agent in the cycle has an item
that the next agent in the cycle desires.
Kidney exchange clearinghouses have also no-
ticed the limitations of pairwise exchanges [11]. Kid-
ney exchange can be a suitable solution when a
healthy person (with two kidneys) wishes to donate
one to a friend or family member but is biologically
incompatible with the intended recipient.1 An incom-
patible donor-patient pair can exchange their donor’s
kidney with one or more other such pairs in a cycle so
that every patient receives a compatible kidney. Kid-
ney exchange is a growing market and there are mul-
1In kidney exchange, an incompatible donor-patient pair
can be thought of as a single agent.
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tiple clearinghouses such as the Alliance for Paired
Donation (APD) and the National Kidney Registy
(NKR) in the United States. Since it is desired that
a donor gives her kidney no later than her associated
patient receives a kidney, cyclic exchanges are con-
ducted simultaneously and are therefore rarely longer
than three.
Each of these markets evolve dynamically with
agents arriving over time. At any point in time,
there is a pool of agents waiting for an exchange, and
possibly some feasible exchanges supported by the
platform technology. In centralized platforms, the
policy employed by the platform determines which
feasible exchanges are executed, and when. We
ask which policy centralized platforms should use,
given the types of supported exchanges. One natural
option is the Greedy policy, where the platform
executes a feasible exchange as soon as the possibility
emerges. Alternatively, the platform can adopt
a Batching policy where it waits for a ‘batch’ of
agents to accumulate, and then identifies a set of
exchanges that maximizes the number of matched
agents, with the remaining agents carried forward
into the next batch. More complex policies are
possible as well. Kidney exchange clearinghouses in
the US have experimented with a variety of batch
lengths in the past, and have subsequently shifted
to very short batches resembling a greedy approach.
When does the greedy policy perform well? What
is the optimal policy, and how does it depend on
the feasible types of exchanges? We address these
questions in this paper.
We simultaneously also quantify the benefits re-
sulting from facilitating multi-way exchanges, relative
to allowing only pairwise exchanges.
Approach and contributions. We consider a styl-
ized dynamic model of agent arrival and departure
that allows us to study how agent outcomes depend
on the policy and types of allowed exchanges.
In each period, an agent arrives with a single
indivisible item that she wishes to exchange. Our
model has a homogeneous and independent stochastic
demand structure, in which every agent A is willing to
exchange his item for any other agent B’s item with
probability p. Figure 1 shows a “compatibility graph”
representation of a snapshot of a barter exchange
marketplace, which captures the interest of agents in
the items of other agents. Exchanges are conducted
via (directed) cycles, and a policy determines which
potential exchanges to conduct. The compatibility
graph evolves in time as new agents arrive, and
existing agents depart after completing exchanges.
Agents who arrive to a barter marketplace want
to quickly complete desirable exchanges. Motivated
by this, the performance metric we consider is the
average waiting time of agents in steady state. (In
various contexts, it may be appropriate to consider
some other cost function that is non-linear in the
waiting time. However, for this foundational work
we choose the simple linear cost function.) Thus,
the optimal policy is one that minimizes the average
waiting time.
We discuss two settings distinguished by the
types of possible/allowed exchanges: (i) only 2-way
cycles, (ii) 2 and 3-way cycles. In each setting, we
seek to identify an approximately optimal policy.
Further, we compare the best achievable expected
waiting time across settings, with a view to quan-
tifying the benefits of facilitating 3-way cycles. Our
key findings, informally stated, are as follows.
• In each of the settings, the Greedy policy is ap-
proximately optimal in a large class of policies
that includes all batching policies. Thus, in par-
ticular, batching does not provide any significant
advantage.
• Under the Greedy policy, allowing three-way cy-
cles leads to substantially smaller average wait-
ing time than only allowing two-way cycles.
More precisely, we show that as p → 0, the aver-
age waiting time under the Greedy policy scales as
Θ(1/p2) for the setting based on two-way cycles, as
Θ(1/p3/2) for the setting based on two and three-way
cycles. Furthermore, for the first setting we show that
a Greedy policy achieves the optimal scaling among
essentially all possible policies2. For the second set-
ting with two and three-way cycles, we prove that
greedy is scaling optimal in a broad class of policies
called monotone policies (see the next section), which
includes batching policies. We remark here that a
small value of p is reasonable in many practical con-
texts, since agents are often interested in only a small
fraction of the items offered by other agents.3 Our re-
sults imply that, in each setting, for all p ∈ (0, 1), the
waiting time under greedy is within a constant factor
of the waiting time using any other batch size. (Sim-
ulation experiments suggest that a batch of size of 1
is, in fact, truly optimal in each setting for any p [2].)
2In fact, for the two-way cycles setting we show that even
the constant factor is tight.
3Even kidney exchange clearinghouses observe a substantial
fraction of highly sensitized patients that have probability
1− 5% of matching.
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Interestingly, our results are consistent with com-
putational experiments in kidney exchange using clin-
ical data [4, 1], despite significant heterogeneity and
other deviations from our model. These studies find
that the benefit of batching relative to greedy, if any,
is marginal, in line with our “greedy is approximately
optimal among batching policies” finding. (This also
matches practice.) Computational experiments have
further demonstrated significant benefits from using
chains4 and 3-way cycles over 2-way cycles in dy-
namic settings [4, 7]. This is consistent with our
theoretical findings regarding the benefits of 3-way
cycles in our model. We note that our results provide
the first theoretical explanation of near optimality of
greedy, whereas benefits from 3-cycles have been pre-
viously found in related models (see below and [2]).
Our model, while simplistic in its compatibility
structure (which is described by a single parame-
ter p), has several advantages. It notably avoids a
“market size” parameter altogether (faster arrival of
agents simply leads to an inverse rescaling of time),
and further avoids a key drawback of previous mod-
els involving stochastic compatibilities [3, 4] that ar-
tificially require p to scale in a particular way with
“market size”.5 Further, studying steady state be-
havior allows us to quantify performance exclusively
in terms of waiting times. The alternative approach
of studying a finite time horizon [4], involves end-
of-period effects that make it necessary to simultane-
ously consider both the waiting times and the number
of matches, hindering performance comparisons.
These advantages of our model come at the
cost of substantial new technical challenges. The
most technical part of the paper involves obtaining
the bounds of the form Θ(1/p2), Θ(1/p3/2). A
key challenge we overcome is that the compatibility
graph between currently waiting agents, conditional
on running greedy so far, is not a directed Erdos-
Renyi graph and has a complex distribution. It is
sparser in terms of compatibilities in a very specific
way: there are no possible exchanges, since the
4Unbounded chains of exchanges are initiated by ‘altruistic
donors’ who donate a kidney without expecting anything
in return. Chains have been increasing more important in
practice. We analyze the case of chains as well in the full
version of this paper [2], but choose to focus here on the
technically more challenging case (especially for three-way
cycles) of cycle removal. For chain removal we again find that
greedy is near optimal.
5These works have a market size parameter n, correspond-
ing to the number of agents in a static or finite horizon setting,
and require that p = Θ(1/n). Such a requirement is problem-
atic, since p is typically exogenous.
greedy policy would already have executed them. We
develop methods to analytically control the graph
with this distribution and the associated dynamical
system. Another contribution is the technique we
develop to prove lower bounds on average waiting
times: this technique involves proof by contradiction,
and is used in the case of two and three cycles.
Our model and analysis bring together the rich
literature on (static) random graph models, e.g., see
[6, 8] with the rich literature on queuing systems
[10, 5]. In our model, the queue of waiting agents
has a graph structure (i.e., the compatibility graph).
Our stochastic model of compatibilities mirrors the
canonical Erdos-Renyi model of a directed (static)
random graph (but the dynamics make it much
more complex). Comparing with common models
of queueing systems, our system is peculiar in that
the queueing system does not contain “servers” per
se. Instead, the queue, in some sense, serves itself
by executing exchanges that the compatibility graph
allows. Nodes form cycles with other nodes. Each
time an exchange is executed, the corresponding
agents/nodes leave the system. As a result, it turns
out that for any reasonable policy the system is
stable, irrespective of the rate of arrival of agents.
If we speed up the arrival rate of agents, the entire
system speeds up by the same factor, and waiting
time reduces by the same factor. Thus, without loss
of generality we consider an arrival rate of 1, with one
agent arriving in each time slot.
Notation. We write that f(p) = O(g(p)) where p ∈
(0, 1], if there exists C <∞ such that |f(p)| ≤ Cg(p)
for all p ∈ (0, 1], and similarly for Θ(·) and Ω(·).
We write that f(p) = o(g(p)) where p ∈ (0, 1], if for
any C > 0, there exists p0 > 0 such that we have
|f(p)| ≤ Cg(p) for all p ≤ p0, and similarly for ω(·).
Given a Markov chain {Xt} defined on a state space
X and given a function f : X → R, for x ∈ X , we use
the shorthand Ex[f(Xt)]
∆
= E[f(Xt) | X0 = x]..
Organization of the paper. We describe our
model formally in Section 2 and state the main results
of the paper in Section 3. In Section 4 we prove our
main results for cycles of length two only. Section
5 describes the proof ideas for the case of two and
three-cycles (technically the most challenging). We
refer to the full version of the paper [2] for complete
proofs and for further discussion of related work.
2 Model
Consider the following model of a barter exchange
where each agent arrives with an item that she wants
3
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to exchange for another item. In our simple binary
model, each agent is (equally) interested in the items
possessed by some of the other agents, and not
interested in the items possessed by the rest.
Compatibility graph representation. The state
of the system at any time can be represented by a
directed graph where each agent is represented by a
node, and a directed edge (i, j) exists if agent j wants
the item of agent i. Let G(t) = (V(t), E(t)) denote the
directed graph of compatibilities observed before time
t.
Dynamics. Initially the system may start in any
state with a finite number of waiting agents. We
consider discrete times t = 0, 1, 2, . . . At each time,
one new agent arrives6. The new node representing
this agent v has an incoming edge from each waiting
agent who wants the item of v, and an outgoing edge
to each waiting agent whose item v wants.
Stochastic compatibility model. The item of the
new agent v is of interest to each of the waiting agents
independently with probability p, and independently,
the agent v is interested in the item of each waiting
agent independently with probability p. Mathemati-
cally, there is a directed edge (in each direction) with
probability p between the arriving node v and each
other node that currently exists in the system, inde-
pendently for all nodes and directions.
Allocation and policies. An allocation in a com-
patibility graph is a set of disjoint exchanges, namely
a set of disjoint cycles. We say that a node that is part
of an allocation is matched. When an allocation con-
sisting of cycles is executed, the compatibility graph
is updated by eliminating the matched nodes and all
their incident edges. Immediately after the arrival of
a new node, the platform can choose to perform one
or more exchanges, based on its chosen policy. Here,
a policy is a mapping from the history of the system
so far to an allocation. An exchange can happen via
a cycle, where a k-way cycle is a directed cycle in the
graph involving k nodes.
Two settings (or technologies) are considered,
differing by the exchanges permitted in an allocation:
allocations can output only cycles of length at most
k, for k = 2, 3.
One natural policy that will play a key role in
our results is the greedy policy. The greedy policy
6One can instead consider a stochastic model of arrivals,
e.g., Poisson arrivals in continuous time. In our setting, such
stochasticity would leave the behavior of the model essentially
unchanged, and indeed, each of our main results extend easily
to the case of Poisson arrivals at rate 1.
attempts to match the maximum number of nodes
upon each arrival.
Definition 2.1. The greedy policy for each of the
settings is defined as follows: At the beginning of each
time period the compatibility graph does not contain
cycles with length at most k. Upon arrival of a new
node, if a cycle with length at most k can be formed
with the newly arrived node, it is removed, with
a uniformly random cycle being chosen if multiple
cycles are formed. Clearly, at the beginning of the
next time period the compatibility graph again does
not contain any cycles with length at most k. The
procedure is described in figure Figure 1.
The performance measure we focus on in this
paper is the average (steady state) waiting time,
which we define to be the average steady state time
interval between the arrival of a node and the time
when this node is removed. This is a natural metric in
our setting, since for any reasonable policy, each node
eventually gets matched and is removed, so policies
differ only in how long it takes for nodes to match.
The system described above operated under the
greedy policy, cf. Definition 2.1 is a Markov chain
with a countably infinite number of states, each state
corresponding to a compatibility graph. Further, this
Markov chain is irreducible since an empty graph
is reachable from any other state. This raises the
question of whether this Markov chain is positive
recurrent. If the answer is positive one can further
study various performance measures.7
We also consider policies other than the greedy
policy, in general the class of policies under which
the system is stationary/periodic and ergodic in the
t → ∞ limit. This includes8 the following class of
policies that generalize Markov policies:
Definition 2.2. We call a policy a periodic Markov
policy if it employs τ homogenous first order Markov
policies in round robin for some τ ∈ N.
In other words, a periodic Markov policy implements
a heterogeneous first order Markov chain, where the
transition matrices repeat cyclically every τ rounds.
Now suppose the resulting Markov chain is irre-
ducible and periodic with period τ ′. Without loss
7The Markov chain turns out to be aperiodic for k = 3,
but for k = 2 it is periodic with period 2. In any case, average
(steady state) waiting time as defined below is a natural metric
for any periodicity.
8More precisely, positive recurrent periodic Markov policies
(that stabilize the system) lead to a periodic and ergodic
system. In any case we are not interested in policies that do
not stabilize the system.
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of generality, assume that τ is a multiple of τ ′ (if not,
redefine τ as per τ ← ττ ′). Now, clearly the sub-
sequence of states starting with the state at time `
and then including states at time intervals of τ , i.e.,
times t = `, `+ τ, `+ 2τ, . . . forms an irreducible ape-
riodic first order Markov chain. If this `-th ‘outer’
Markov chain is positive recurrent, we conclude that
it converges to its unique steady state, leading to a
periodic steady state for the original system with pe-
riod τ . Define
W` ≡ Expected number of nodes in the system in
the steady state of the `-th outer Markov chain.
Thus, W` is the expected number of nodes in the
system at times that are ` mod τ in steady state.
Then we define the average waiting time for a periodic
Markov policy asW = (1/τ)
∑τ−1
`=0 W`. Note that this
is the average number of nodes in the original system
over a long horizon in steady state. Recalling Little’s
law, this is hence identical to the average waiting time
for agents who arrive to the system in steady state.
Remark 2.1. We state our results formally for this
broad class of periodic Markov policies, though our
bounds extend also to other general policies that lead
to a stationary/periodic and ergodic system in the
t→∞ limit.
3 Main results
We consider two different settings: a) two-way cycles
only, b) two-way cycles and three-way cycles.
Two-way cycles only. Our first result considers
only 2-way cycles:
Theorem 3.1. Under the setting k = 2, i.e., re-
moval of two-way cycles only, the greedy policy (cf.
Definition 2.1) achieves an average waiting time of
ln 2/p2 + o(1/p2). This is optimal, in the sense that
for every periodic Markov policy, cf. Definition 2.2,
the average waiting time is at least ln 2/(− ln(1 −
p2)) = ln 2/p2 + o(1/p2).
The key fact leading to this theorem is that the prior
probability of having a two-cycle between a given pair
of nodes is p2, so an agent needs Θ(1/p2) options
in order to find another agent with whom a mutual
swap is desirable. This result is technically by far the
simpler one, but of equal interest in its implications.
We prove Theorem 3.1 in Section 4.
Two-way cycles and three-way cycles. Our
second result considers the case of cycle removals with
k = 3. Our lower bound in this case applies to a
specific class of policies which we now define.
Let G denote the global compatibility graph that
includes all nodes that ever arrive to the system, and
directed edges representing compatibilities between
them.
Definition 3.1. A deterministic policy is said to
be monotone if it satisfies the following property:
Consider any pair of nodes (i, j) and an arbitrary
global compatibility graph G such that the edge (i, j)
is present. Let G¯ be the graph obtained from G when
edge (i, j) is removed. Let Ti and Tj be the times
of removal of nodes i and j respectively when the
compatibility graph is G and let Tij = min(Ti, Tj).
Then the policy must act in an identical fashion on
G¯ and G for all t < Tij, i.e., the same cycles are
removed at the same times in each case, up to time
Tij. This property must hold for every pair of nodes
(i, j) and every possible G containing the edge (i, j).
A randomized policy is said to be monotone if it
randomizes between deterministic monotone policies.
Remark 3.1. Consider the greedy policy for cycle
removal defined above. It is easy to see that we can
suitably couple the execution of greedy on different
global compatibility graphs such that the resulting
policy is monotone. The same applies to a batching
policy which matches periodically (after arrival of
x nodes), by finding a maximum packing of node
disjoint cycles and removing them9.
Note that the class of monotone policies includes
a variety of policies in addition to simple batching
policies. For instance, a policy that assigns weights to
nodes and finds an allocation with maximum weight
(instead of simply maximizing the number of nodes
matched) is also monotone.
Theorem 3.2. Under the setting k = 3, i.e., re-
moval of two and three-way cycles, the average wait-
ing time under the greedy policy (cf. Definition 2.1)
is O(1/p3/2). Furthermore, there exists a constant
C < ∞ such that, for any monotone policy that is
periodic Markov (see Definitions 3.1 and 2.2), the av-
erage waiting time is at least 1/(Cp3/2).
Theorem 3.2 says that we can achieve a much
smaller waiting time with k = 3, i.e., two and three-
cycle removal, than the removal of two-cycles only
(for small p). Further, for k = 3 greedy is again near
9Note that such a policy is periodic Markov with a period
equal to the batch size.
5
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n1 n2 n3 n4 n1 n2 n3 n4
n5 n6
n1 n3
n5
Figure 1: An illustration of cycle matching under the greedy policy, with a maximum cycle length of 3.
Initially, nodes n1, n2, n3, and n4 are all waiting, as shown on the left. Node n5 arrives, but no directed
cycles can be formed. Then n6 arrives, forming the three cycle n6 → n2 → n4 → n6. On the right, the three
cycle is removed, along with the edges incident to any node in the three cycle. Note that when n6 arrives,
a six cycle is also formed, but under our assumptions, the maximum length cycle that can be removed is a
three cycle.
optimal in the sense that no monotone policy can
beat greedy by more than a constant factor. Theorem
3.2 is proved in Section 5. The proof overcomes
a multitude of technical challenges arising from the
complex distribution of the compatibility graph at a
given time, and introduces several new ideas.
We remark that we could not think of any
good candidate policy in our homogeneous model of
compatibility that violates monotonicity but should
do well on average waiting time. As such, we
conjecture (but were unable to prove) that our lower
bound on average waiting time applies to arbitrary
and not just monotone policies.
The following fact may provide some intuition for
the Θ(1/p3/2) scaling of average waiting time10: In a
static directed Erdo˝s-Re´nyi graph with (small) edge
probability p, one needs the number of nodes n to
grow as Ω(1/p3/2) in order to, with high probability,
cover a fixed fraction (e.g., 50%) of the nodes with
node disjoint two and three cycles11. Our rigorous
analysis leading to Theorem 3.2 shows that this
coarse calculation in fact leads to the correct scaling
for average number of nodes in the dynamic system
under the greedy policy, and that no monotone policy
can do better.
Our result leaves open the case of larger cycles,
i.e. k > 3, under the greedy, arbitrary monotone and
arbitrary general policies. Based on intuition similar
to the above, we conjecture that for the setting with
removal of cycles of length up to k, the greedy policy
10Recall that the average number of nodes is the same as the
average waiting time, using Little’s law.
11The expected total number of three cycles is n3p3 and the
expected number of node disjoint three cycles is of the same
order for n3p3 . n. We need n3p3 ∼ n in order to cover a
given fraction of nodes with node disjoint three cycles, leading
to n & 1/p3/2. For n ∼ 1/p3/2, the number of two-cycles is
n2p2 ∼ 1/p = o(n), i.e., very few nodes are part of two-cycles.
achieves the average waiting time of Θ(p−
k
k−1 ), and
furthermore for every policy the average waiting time
is lower bounded by Ω(p−
k
k−1 ).
4 Two-way cycle removal
In this section we consider removal of two-cycles only,
i.e., k = 2. The greedy policy corresponding k = 2 is
simple to characterize, since, as we show below, the
underlying process behaves as a simple random walk.
We observe that the random walk has a negative
drift when |V(t)| ≥ log(2)/p2, and obtain a tight
characterization of waiting time under greedy using a
simple coupling argument. The key idea for the lower
bound is that regardless of the implemented policy,
the rate at which 2-cycles which will be eventually
removed are formed must equal to the half of the
rate at which new nodes arrive, which is equal to
unity. Further, the probability that we do not form
any cycles which will be eventually removed is lower
bounded by the probability that we do not form any
cycles at all. This probability depends only on the
number of nodes in the system, the desired quantity.
Proof. [Theorem 3.1] We first compute the expected
steady state waiting time under the greedy policy.
Observe that for all t ≥ 0,
|V(t+ 1)| =
{
|V(t)|+ 1 w.p. (1− p2)|V(t)| ,
|V(t)| − 1 w.p. 1− (1− p2)|V(t)| .
Let ε > 0 be arbitrary. If |V(t)| > (1 + ε) ln(2)/p2,
then there exists a sufficiently small p = p(ε) such
that for all p > p(ε)
P(|V(t+ 1)| = |V(t)|+ 1) = (1− p2)|V(t)| ≤ 1
21+ε
.
Let q = 1/21+ε < 1/2, and let Xt be a sequence of
1930 Copyright © 2015.
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i.i.d. random variables with distribution
Xt =
{
1 w.p. q ,
−1 w.p. 1− q .
Let S0 = 0 and for t ≥ 1, St+1 = (St +Xt)+, so St is
a Birth-Death process. Letting r = q/(1− q) < 1, in
steady state P(S∞ = i) = ri(1 − r) for i = 0, 1, . . . ,
so
E[S∞] = r/(1− r) = q/(1− 2q) = 1
21+ε − 2 .
We can couple the random walk |V(t)| with St such
that |V(t)| < (1+ε) ln(2)/p2 +St for all t. This yields
E[|V(∞)|] ≤ (1 + ε) ln(2)
p2
+ E[S∞]
≤ (1 + ε) ln(2)
p2
+
1
21+ε − 2 .
Thus for every ε > 0, we have
lim
p→0
E[|V(∞)|]− ln(2)/p2
1/p2
≤ ε ln(2).
As ε was arbitrary, the result follows.
Now we establish the lower bound on |V(∞)|.
Let v be a newly arriving node at time t, and W
be the nodes currently in system that are waiting to
be matched. Let I be the indicator that at the arrival
time of v (just before cycles are potentially deleted),
no 2-cycles between v and any node in W exist. Let
I˜ be the indicator that at the arrival time of v, no
two cycles that will be eventually removed that are
between v and any node in W exist (in particular, I˜
depends on the future). Thus I˜ ≥ I a.s. Let V˜t be the
number of vertices in the system before time t such
that the cycle which eventually removes them has not
yet arrived. We let V˜∞ be the distribution of V˜t when
the system begins in steady state. By stationarity
0 = E[V˜t+1 − V˜t] = EV˜∞ [2I˜ − 1],
giving E[I˜] = 1/2. Intuitively, in steady state, the
expected change in the number of vertices not yet
“matched” must be zero. Thus we obtain
1
2
= E[I˜] ≥ E[I] = E[E[I | |V(∞)]]
= E
[
(1− p2)|V(∞)|
]
≥ (1− p2)E[V(∞)],
by Jensen’s inequality. Taking logarithms on both
sides and rearranging terms, we get
E[|V(∞)|] ≥ log(1/2)
log(1− p2) =
log(2)
− log(1− p2) .
5 Three-way cycle removal: main proof ideas
The proof of Theorem 3.2 (see [2]) is far more involved
than for the case k = 2, especially the upper bound,
and relies on delicate combinatorial analysis of 3-
cycles in a random graph formed by nodes present
in the system in steady state and those arriving over
a certain time interval. We consider a time interval
of the order Θ(1/p3/2) and assume that the system
starts with at least order Θ(1/p3/2) nodes in the
underlying graph. We establish a negative drift in
the system and then rely on a Lyapunov function
technique in order to establish the required upper
bound.
We bound the waiting time under greedy us-
ing a natural Lyapunov function: the number of
nodes/agents in the system. A challenge here is that
we need to establish a negative drift for any starting
residual graph containing nt ≥ n0 nodes, for some
n0 = O(1/p
3/2). In particular, we need to show that
the expected number of nodes decreases even if the
residual graph contain no edges. Clearly, considering
a single arrival will not allow formation of any three
cycles in an empty graph, and the likelihood of forma-
tion of a two cycle is very small for nt = o(1/p
2). In
fact, one needs to look at T = Θ(1/n3/2) consecutive
arrivals in order to ensure negative drift in expecta-
tion during that period of length T , irrespective of the
residual graph at the start. The analysis is extremely
involved since the greedy policy continues to be ex-
ecuted during this interval of length T , so the graph
at each time is difficult to control. We show that
even if the graph at the start is empty, for appropri-
ate T and n0, the next T arrivals mostly form three-
cycles containing two new arrivals and one previously
present node (few arrivals form cycles between them-
selves, and few are still present at t + T ), leading to
an expected reduction in the number of nodes in the
system. For this, we need to define and control half a
dozen different appropriate ‘failure’ events, show that
each failure event is unlikely to occur, and show a re-
duction in the number of nodes in the system if there
is no failure. Note that two-cycles play little role in
this setting since formation of a two-cycle is very rare
when E[nt] = W = Θ(1/p3/2).
For the lower bound, we introduce a novel ap-
proach that allows us to prove a matching lower
bound (up to constants) for monotone policies by
contradiction. The rough idea is as follows: if the
steady state expected waiting time is small (in this
case smaller than 1/(Cp3/2) for appropriate C), then
a typical new arrival sees a small number of nodes
currently in the system, and so typically does not
7
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form a two or three-cycle with existing nodes or even
the next few arrivals. Thus, the typical arrival typi-
cally has a long waiting time, which contradicts our
initial assumption of a small expected waiting time.
We remark that the following conjecture results
if we assume that nt (the number of agents in the
system at time t) concentrates, and that the typical
number of edges in a compatibility graph at time t
with nt nodes is close to what it would have been
under an Erdos-Renyi graph with nt nodes and edge
probability p.
Conjecture 5.1. For the removal of two and three-
way cycles (k = 3), the expected waiting time
in steady state under a greedy policy scales as√
ln(3/2)/p3/2 + o(1/p3/2), and no periodic Markov
policy (including non-monotone policies) can achieve
an expected waiting time that scales better than this.
Here the constant
√
ln(3/2) results from requiring
(under our assumptions) that a newly arrived node
forms a triangle with probability 1/3.
Simulation results were consistent with this con-
jecture: the predicted expected waiting time for
greedy from the leading term
√
ln(3/2)/p3/2 is W =
80 for p = 0.04, W = 43 for p = 0.06, W = 28 for
p = 0.08 and W = 20.1 for p = 0.1. If proved, this
conjecture would be refinement of Theorem 3.2. A
proof would require a significantly more refined anal-
ysis for both the upper bound and the lower bound.
6 Conclusion
Overcoming the rare coincidence of wants is a major
obstacle in facilitating timely exchanges for agents in
a barter marketplace. In this paper we studied how
the policy adopted by the clearinghouse affect agents’
waiting times in a thin marketplace. We investigated
this question for a variety of settings determined by
the feasible types of exchanges, which are largely
driven by the technology adopted by the marketplace.
We also studied how the feasible types of exchanges
affect the waiting times.
We studied these questions in a dynamic model
with a stylized homogenous stochastic demand struc-
ture. The market is represented by a compatibility
graph: agents are represented by nodes, and each di-
rected edge, which represents that the source agent
has an item that is acceptable to the target agent, ex-
ists a priori with probability p. Exchanges take place
in the form of cycles. The key technical challenge we
face is that in our dynamic setting, the compatibil-
ity graph between agents present at a particular time
has a complicated distribution that depends on the
feasible exchanges and the policy employed by the
clearinghouse.
We analyzed the long run average time agents
spend waiting to exchange their item, in a two set-
tings with respect to feasible exchanges: 2-way cycles
only, and 2 and 3-way cycles. Our main finding is that
regardless of the setting, the greedy policy which at-
tempts to match upon each arrival, is approximately
optimal (minimizes average waiting time) among a
large class of policies that includes batching policies.
We also find that three-way cycles lead to a large
improvement in waiting times relative to two-cycles
only. Although we do not model important details of
kidney exchange clearinghouses, our findings are con-
sistent with computational experiments and practice
in that context.
Our work raises several further questions and we
describe here a few of these. Allowing for heteroge-
neous agents or goods may lead to different qualita-
tive results in some settings. For example, if Bob is
a very difficult-to-please agent who is willing to ac-
cept only Alice’s item but they are not both currently
part of any feasible exchange, it may be beneficial to
make Alice wait for some time in the hope of finding
an exchange that can allow Bob to get Alice’s item.
Thus, when cycles of more than two agents are per-
mitted, some waiting may improve efficiency in the
presence of heterogeneity (some evidence for this has
been found [4]).
Finally, unbounded chains of exchanges initiated
by ‘altruistic donors’ have been increasing more im-
portant in practice. We analyze the case of chains
as well in the full version of this paper [2], and again
find that greedy is near optimal in that setting.
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